This is the first study that considered technical and tactical aspects of water polo according to the new international rule and a margin of victory. In particular, the in-troducing of the latter factor allowed to investigate the water polo game by means of a higher awareness, to minimize the effect of the situational nature that inevitably makes hard the replication of technical and tactical analyses (Lupo et al., 2010) and, coherently to other team sports (Csataljay et al., 2009; Gómez et al., 2008; Sampaio and Janeira, 2003; Sampaio et al., 2010; Vaz et al., 2010), to define the influence of match outcomes on performance. Nevertheless, in this study, different playing strategies sometimes favored high data heterogeneity (high standard deviations and ranges, and small ESs), even for teams appertaining to the same category of margin of victory. The main finding of this study showed that the men’s water polo matches of the World Championships are mainly characterized by the divergence between closed and unbalanced games rather than the comparison between winning and losing teams. Thus, it could assume that the game aspects of the elite men’s water polo matches have to be analyzed in relation to specific margins of victory and not only considering the winning and losing outcome. For even offensive actions, the higher ML’s occurrence with respect to the W and MW ones emerged for effect of a minor frequency of counterattacks, probably due to a low ability to promptly perform the offensive action. In terms of power-play actions, both teams playing closed games (W and L) reported higher occurrences with respect to those of unbalanced game (MW and ML), confirming the importance of this particular game phase, previously highlighted in other studies on elite men’s water polo (Lupo et al., 2007; 2010). The reduced occurrences of the transitions (range: 4-6%) limit any possible explanations on the relative data. In line to a previous study on elite and sub-elite men’s water polo (Lupo et al., 2010), the shorter duration of the L’s even actions with respect to the W and ML ones could be interpreted in favor of a different grade of ability to maintain ball possessions and to defense. In particular, it could be speculated that W are more able to maintain the ball possession, while ML hardly find good opportunity to score a goal, spending more time to perform action. On the other hand, for power-play, MW showed a shorter duration than that of the ML, W and L, speculating that, during unbalanced games, the winning teams could obtain offensive opportunities to successfully shot (as demonstrated by the goal and "no goal shot" occurrences) after few seconds from the origin of the action. In terms of scored goals, winning teams showed their supremacy with respect to losing teams especially during even and power-play actions. However, as easily expected, for both goals scored and "no goal shots" indicators, the main divergence emerged between MW and ML, speculating different grade of abilities to create effective offensive playing opportunities as well as to limit opponent play. Although in previous studies (Lupo et al., 2007; 2010), the best men’s water polo teams achieve high occurrence of opponent exclusions during even action in order to perform a consequent high number of power-play actions, the present data did not show any effect between winning and losing teams, but only between teams playing closed games (W and L) and MW, highlighting how this game phase (i.e., the passage from the exclusion achieved during even actions to the power-play actions) is crucial for team playing matches with small margin of victory. The lost possessions occurring during even and power-play actions, as well as the penalty achieved during even action, showed huge divergences between teams perform-ing unbalanced games, inferring likely for the interpretation of action duration data, divergent offensive abilities to maintain ball possession and defensive skills to steal the opposite ball possession. The analysis of origin of shots did not display significant effects. However, for each game situation, winning teams showed high values of shots (despite statistically reported only for Counterattacks, between MW and L, and ML) originated from the "zone 6" (i.e., the central zone inside the five-meter area) with respect to losing ones, suggesting that the winnings teams are more able to centrally penetrate inside the five-meter area (rationally considered as the most favorable position to score a goal) and the losing ones are scarcely skilled to defend. Consistent with the literature (Hughes et al., 2006; Lupo et al., 2010; 2011), the most performed technical execution of shots was drive shot. In particular, it could be inferred that this type of shot provides the best opportunity to end the action quickly, which is useful to limit the opponents defensive counter act. Nevertheless, for even actions, W reported a significant low occurrence of drive shots and a higher frequency of "off-the-water shot" with respect to ML, determining, therefore, an extended selection of shot executions. Conversely, for power-play actions, the lower occurrence of the W’s shots after 1 fake with respect to the L one could be interpreted according to the latter’s necessity to mislead the goalkeeper (Lupo et al., 2010), instead of ending the action with a quick shot, which seems to be the best play solution considering the related goal and "no goal shot" data (W: goal = 44 ± 17%, "no goal shots" = 41 ± 19; L: goal = 36 ± 11, "no goal shots" = 51 ± 13). The play events occurring at the end of even actions by centre forward and perimeter players reported quite balanced occurrences, therefore confirming the already highlighted high impact of centre forward for the game of an entire team (Lupo et al., 2007), because the offensive arrangements are mainly characterized by the presence of 5 perimeter players and only one centre forward (Figure 2). The analysis of the even offensive arrangements showed that the teams performing closed games showed more (>90%) complete offensive arrangements (i.e., 6 or 5 offensive players) than MW (88%) and ML (84%), probably for a divergent technical and tactical, and physical abilities to quickly perform the swimming phases useful to complete an offensive arrangement, within the limit of 30 seconds clock-time of a single ball possession (FINA, 2010). Although, for the power-play offensive arrangement, the 3:3 arrangement ended by perimeter player reported a difference between MW and ML, their low occurrences limit any potential interpretation. However, consistent with previous studies (Hughes et al., 2006; Lupo et al., 2010), the 4:2 arrangement resulted the most adopted Power play offensive arrangement. Relatively to the defensive arrangement performed during even actions, the high occurrence of the "zone 2" performed during closed games (W and L) showed how in these matches it is important to minimize the opponent centre forward play, which is crucial to obtain an opponent exclusion foul (Lupo et al., 2007; 2008). Conversely, during unbalanced games (MW and ML), the above mentioned defensive strategy was not evident, while "pressing" emerged as the most approved. Coherently to even actions, for the defensive arrangements of power-play, the teams performing the closed games tended to principally cover the opponent players located close to their goal ("cluster" defence) instead of pressing the perimeter players ("anticipating" defence; Figure 3). |